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 Technologies are the tools that
 people use to get things done, but
 the promise of new technology is
 limited by its successful implemen-
 tation in organizations. Visits to any
 technology fair or convention cannot
 but help to instill a sense of wonder
 and anticipation given the breadth
 of the possibilities. The 1992 Fall
 Comdex scheduled over 2,000 ven-
 dors and 140,000 visitors (Dvorak,
 1993; Malloy, 1993). However, the
 vision is often different if the exhib-
 ited products are followed into an
 organization. Marzchzak suggested
 in 1988 that most new production
 technology implementations fail.
 Similarly, Bikson and Gutek (1984)
 found that 40% of 2,000 surveyed
 U.S. companies had not achieved the
 intended benefits from implement-
 ing new office technology. There is
 little to suggest that this deplorable
 situation is changing. A large pro-
 portion of implementation attempts
 continue to fail to accomplish their
 stated goals and potential adopters
 are beginning to question the real
 value of new office technologies
 (Bowen, 1986). This paper offers an
 elaborated model of new technology
 implementation. This model ex-
 plains two important paradoxes of
 new technology introductions by em-
 phasizing the critical role of adopt-
 ers' cognitions including adopters'
 thoughts, perceptions, and con-
 structed understandings of the new
 technology (e.g., Barley, 1986;
 Goodman and Griffith, 1991; Orli-
 kowski, 1992; Sproull and Hofmeis-
 ter, 1986).
 Although there are many defi-
 nitions of technology, here we will
 use "technology" to refer to any
 system of components that act on
 * The authors would like to thank Dorothy Leonard-Barton for her comments on an earlier
 draft.
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 or change an object from one state
 to another (Goodman and Griffith,
 1991). Specific examples of new
 technologies include (but are not
 limited to): computer-aided man-
 ufacturing, computerized group
 decision support tools (software
 and hardware), and electronic mail.
 The focus of our model is the im-
 plementation of new technology.
 Implementation includes any proc-
 esses undertaken to institutionalize
 a new technology as a stable part
 of the organization (Tornatzky and
 Johnson, 1982; Ettlie, 1984; Lucas,
 1986). Users and implementers are
 the major actors during new tech-
 nology implementation, and are
 also the focus of the model pre-
 sented here. Implementers are the
 agents for new technology intro-
 duction, including those individuals
 who train and support new users.
 Users are the individuals who use
 the new technology to get work
 done.
 Traditional Models of
 Implementation
 Successful implementation efforts
 can be characterized in terms of the
 stages, processes, and goals de-
 scribed in Figure 1. This review fo-
 cuses specifically on the cognitive
 aspects of new technology imple-
 mentation. (For a comprehensive re-
 view of new technology implemen-
 tation see, Goodman and Griffith,
 1991; Zammuto and O'Connor,
 1992.)
 Stages
 Lewin's (1951) classic model of
 change in organizations suggests
 three critical stages in the imple-
 mentation of a new technology: un-
 freezing, movement, and re reezing.
 Over the year , researchers have
 modified Lewin's model in a number
 of ways (e.g., lippitt et al., 1958),
 primarily by adding a fou th stage
 in the change process: diagnosis. Di-
 agnosis is gene ally a prerequisite to
 the implementation of a new tech-
 nology. Diagnosis entails identifying
 the problem or opportunity that in-
 vokes a change, identifying the fea-
 tures of the problem or opportunity,
 and then selecting an appropriate
 action plan (for instance, a new tech-
 nology!) that appears to solve the
 problem or address the opportunity
 (Northcraft and Neale, 1994). In the
 technology literature, diagnosis is re-
 ferred to as the adoption decision
 (e.g., Dean, 1987).
 Unfreezing follows diagnosis.
 The primary purpose of the un-
 freezing stage is for implementers
 to build a successful foundation on
 which the actual change to a new
 technology can take place. During
 unfreezing, implementers of a new
 technology must break down the
 resistance of prospective users.
 That may entail selling prospective
 users on the appropriateness of the
 diagnosis, so that the change seems
 meaningful and sensible. Unfreez-
 ing certainly entails making sure
 that prospective users understand
 the new technology, and are pre-
 pared for the consequences of
 changing over to the new technol-
 ogy (e.g., decreased performance
 during the "breaking in" period).
 Following unfreezing is the move-
 ment stage of implementation,
 when the new technology is
 brought on line and prospective
 users become users. The final stage
 of implementation is refreezing.
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 Figure 1
 Implementation Characteristics
 STAGES PROCESSES GOALS
 Diagnosis Socialization Knowledge
 Unfreezing Commitment Attitudes
 Movement Reward Allocation Use
 Refreezing Feedback-and-Redesign Group Norms
 Diffusion
 During refreezing, implementers
 must follow-up even apparently
 successful new technology intro-
 ductions to insure that favorable
 changes attained during introduc-
 tion of the new technology become
 institutionalized in the organiza-
 tion. Refreezing during a new tech-
 nology implementation may
 include adjustments to the organi-
 zation as well as to the technology
 (Leonard-Barton, 1988).
 Perhaps the greatest roadblock to
 successful new technology imple-
 mentation is that unfreezing and
 refreezing - preparing the organi-
 zation for a new technology and in-
 suring that the technology has been
 accepted - typically command far
 less organizational attention than
 diagnosis and movement. Diagnosis
 and movement have clear, con-
 crete, and definable goals, namely,
 find the best technology for the
 purpose (diagnosis) and get it in
 the hands of prospective users
 (movement). In contrast, unfreez-
 ing and refreezing of prospective
 us  - breaking down their resis-
 tance and gaining their acceptance
 and use of the new technology -
 are ambiguous processes with no
 visible end (Goodman and Griffith,
 1991). In fact, refreezing might be
 thought of as a continuance of the
 fine-tuning of users' acceptance
 which was initiated during unfreez-
 ing. Unfortunately, adoption deci-
 sion makers often incorrectly
 assume that what has become clear
 to them after many hours of di-
 agnosis deliberations will, of
 course, be self-evident to users dur-
 ing movement (Rogers and Shoe-
 maker, 1971).
 Processes
 Goodman and Griffith (1991) sug-
 gest that successful implementation
 requires that five critical dynamic
 processes occur: socialization, com-
 mitment, reward allocation, feed-
 back-and-redesign, and diffusion.
 These processes will be differentially
 JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. V Number 4 Winter 1993
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 important depending on the stage of
 the implementation and the partic-
 ular setting. Socialization involves
 having users come to understand the
 new technology, in particular seeing
 it as an integral part of the accom-
 plishment of their work tasks, rather
 than something separate or extra.
 Socialization begins during unfreez-
 ing when implementers begin to sell
 prospective users on the appropri-
 ateness of the new technology. So-
 cialization continues for as long as
 there are new users and/or adapta-
 tions to the technology. Commit-
 ment occurs when users have
 accepted the technology to the point
 that they are willing to work at mak-
 ing it successful. The successful com-
 mitment of users to a new
 technology can begin as early as di-
 agnosis, if prospective users are in-
 volved in the selection of the new
 techology (Huse and Cummings,
 1985). Reward allocation refers to
 users coming to see the value (and/
 or costs) of using the new technol-
 ogy. Reward allocations may be di-
 rect incentives for using the tech-
 nology (e.g., monetary bonuses for
 use) or rewards that accrue because
 the technology makes users' work
 easier or better. Convincing pro-
 spective users of the rewards of a
 new technology is imperative dur-
 ing unfreezing, though additional
 rewards (and costs) often are re-
 vealed during movement and re-
 freezing. Feedback-and-redesign
 occurs when users develop a suf-
 ficient understanding of a new
 technology to adjust it, or the or-
 ganization around the new tech-
 nology, to new and better uses.
 Leonard-Barton (1988) has noted
 that implementation success is crit-
 ically dependent upon users attain-
 i g an adaptive fit between new
 technology and the organization to
 chieve a synergistic result. Diffu-
 sion refers to the spread of the new
 technology thro gh the organiza-
 tion. Diffusion and feedback-and-
 redesign are critical components of
 the movement and efreezing
 tages of a ew tech ology imple
 mentation. To the extent that dif-
 fusion and feedback-and-redes gn
 are more successful, c mmitment
 and socialization are more likely to
 occur. On the other hand, diffu-
 sion and feedback-and-redesign are
 more likely to occur once a new
 technology has been accepted (so-
 cialization) and users are commit-
 ted to its success.
 Goals
 The success of a new technology
 implementation can be measured
 by four implementation goals:
 users' knowledge of the system,
 their attitudes toward the new tech-
 nology, their actual use of the tech-
 nology, and finally group norms
 concerning the acceptance and
 value of the new technology in the
 organization (Goodman and Grif-
 fith, 1991). These goals also may
 vary in importance, depending
 upon the stage of the implemen-
 tation and the technology (Good-
 man and Griffith, 1991). For
 instance, users' attitudes would be
 a primary concern during unfreez-
 ing, since a positive attitude might
 be a necessary prerequisite to ac-
 quiring knowledge about using the
 system. Actual use and group
 norms, on the other hand, would
 seem to be more critical measures
 during refreezing where they
 would define the long-term success
 of the implementation.
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 A Frame-Based Model of
 Implementation
 Within these stages, processes,
 and goals of new technology im-
 plementation, several researchers
 (e.g., Barley, 1986; Goodman and
 Griffith, 1991; Sproull and Hof-
 meister, 1986) have emphasized the
 critical role of cognitions. Cogni-
 tions are what goes on in people's
 minds, including thoughts, beliefs,
 and understandings. These cogni-
 tions include beliefs held by users
 (and implementers) about the roles,
 relationships, goals, and processes
 of the new technology. However,
 there has been little empirical work
 focusing on the socialization and/or
 commitment processes in new tech-
 nology implementation (Goodman
 and Griffith, 1991; Sproull and
 Hofmeister, 1986) where imple-
 menters would be expected to de-
 velop favorable cognitions in users.
 This seems a puzzling oversight,
 since only 10% of implementation
 failures appear to be the result of
 technical problems (i.e., poor di-
 agnosis). Most implementation fail-
 ures stem from ''human and
 organizational" problems (Tur-
 nage, 1990), that is, poor manage-
 ment by implementers of the
 unfreezing, movement, and re-
 freezing of a new technology.
 One cognition of particular in-
 terest in new technology imple-
 mentation is the frame (e.g.,
 Goffman, 1974). Frames are the
 perceptual sets that individuals
 bring to or develop during imple-
 mentation. Frames direct an indi-
 vidual's critical perception
 processes (Pinkley, 1991), including
 what to attend to, what to make of
 something, and how to interpret it.
 Frames invoke selective perception
 processes (e.g., Dearborn and
 Simon, 1958) and thus play a role
 in how users make sense of a new
 technology in its organizational set-
 ting (e.g., Louis, 1980). Frames are
 related to the knowledge structures
 (including schémas and scripts) that
 help individuals understand what
 things are when they look at them
 (Taylor and Crocker, 1980). How-
 ever, frames are pre-schematic and
 help individuals decide what
 knowledge structures (e.g., schema
 or scripts) apply to a given situa-
 tion. In implementation, the users*
 frames will limit both what they
 hear in implementers' introduc-
 tions and training, as well as how
 users interpret the new technology
 when they experience it.
 The model of new technology
 implementation that follows in this
 paper elaborates the critical role
 that implementer and user frames
 play in successful implementation
 (as shown in Figure 2). The focus
 of this model is the user, the target
 of the implementation effort. This
 model has four important ele-
 ments: (1) implementer frames
 and the information these frames
 lead implementers to provide users
 during implementation, (2) user
 frames and the information they
 lead users to seek during imple-
 mentation, (3) user experiences
 with the new technology when they
 work with it, and finally (4) users'
 social constructions (e.g., Barley,
 1986) of the technology. Users' so-
 cial constructions of a new tech-
 nology are the understandings
 (what it is, what it can do) that
 users come to believe. Users' social
 constructions are the outcome of
 interest in the model because users'
 JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. V Number 4 Winter 1993
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 social constructions subsume three
 of the four goals of implementation
 noted above (knowledge, attitudes,
 and group norms), all of which to-
 gether should drive the real goal of
 implementation - effective use of
 the technology. In this model,
 users' social constructions are a
 consequence of the interaction of
 user and implementer frames and
 user experiences with the technol-
 ogy during implementation. This
 model builds on Sproull and Hof-
 meister's (1986) work and links it
 with March's (1971) ideas of the
 technology of foolishness. The
 model predicts both promises and
 pitfalls. Some managerial implica-
 tions are identified which may im-
 prove successful implementation.
 The basic argument of the model
 is that users come to implementa-
 tion with a frame that affects the
 information they search for, while
 implementers enter implementa-
 tion with a frame that affects the
 information that they provide to
 users. As shown in Figure 2, users
 construct an understanding of the
 technology - how to use it and
 whether it is worth using - based
 upon the information they are pro-
 vided by implementers and the ex-
 periences they have with the
 technology. Users' constructed un-
 derstandings guide their interpre-
 tation of subsequent experiences
 with the technology, and those sub-
 sequent experiences with the tech-
 nology in turn provide users
 opportunities to test and modify
 their constructions. The contrast
 between the information users nat-
 urally seek and the information im-
 plementers provide creates two
 important paradoxes: The two par-
 adoxes represent the pitfalls and
 promise of new technology imple-
 mentation.
 PARADOX 1:
 The Paradox of Value
 Sproull and Hofmeister (1986)
 present one of the few studies fo-
 cused on users' frames during new
 technology implementation, and
 conclude that new technology im-
 plementation contains a "paradox
 of value." Sproull and Hofmeister
 studied a superintendent's imple-
 mentation attempt of an account-
 ability program (focusing on
 teaching materials and testing) in a
 large city school district. They
 found that the superintendent (as
 implementer) emphasized the pro-
 gram's positive features because
 they were salient to him and in or-
 der to encourage people to try the
 system. "But, as is inevitably the
 case, things did not go perfectly
 with.." the program and the users
 decreased their positive regard for
 the program (Sproull and Hof-
 meister, 1986:57). The paradox is
 that had the superintendent prom-
 ised less, the users might have been
 less discouraged with the program's
 faults.
 Sproull and Hofmeister (1986)
 show that the frames of implemen-
 ters diverge significantly from the
 frames of the prospective users, as
 shown in Figure 3. We characterize
 these two dimensions as Positive/
 Negative and Description/Opera-
 tion (Griffith and Northcraft,
 1991). Implementers focus on a
 view of the new technology that is
 positively biased, more favorable
 than it should be (e.g., Baier et al,
 1986). The source of this positive
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 Figure 2
 Frame-Based Model of the Social Construction of a New Technology
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 bias may be role demands. Imple-
 menter s may focus on the positive
 aspects of the new technology be-
 cause of their role as advocates for
 the technolgy; that is, implemen-
 ters may feel that it is their job to
 present the new technology in the
 best light. These role demands
 might elicit self-justification proc-
 esses (e.g., Staw and Ross, 1979).
 Implementers may come to es-
 pouse only positive views of the
 technology because their role
 forces them to publicly voice such
 opinions, and it is easier to present
 such views publicly when one be-
 lieves in them. Finally, implemen-
 ters' great exposure to and
 expertise with the new technology
 no doubt allows them to adjust to
 the limitations or costs of a new
 technology, making those limita-
 tions or costs less frustrating or an-
 noying than they might be to
 someone encountering the tech-
 nology for the first time. The nat-
 ural frames of users, on the other
 hand, tend to be more balanced,
 focusing on both positive and neg-
 ative aspects of the new technology
 (Griffith and Northcraft, 1991).
 Without any prior introduction, ex-
 perience, or a vested interest in the
 success of the technology, users are
 likely to have a much more objec-
 tive view of the new technology,
 one that sees (or at least searches
 for) both the positive and negative
 aspects.
 Implementers also tend to be
 more focused on why to use the
 new technology (its benefits and
 uses). Users, in contrast, also want
 to know how to use the technology.
 For example, Griffith and North-
craft (1991) asked novice users of
 a group support system (electronic
 meeting hardware and software) to
list the five most important things
 they would tell new users of the
 system. Although Positive/Descrip-
 tion information dominated, novice
 JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. V Number 4 Winter 1993
 472 Griffith and Northcraft
 Figure 3
 Balanced and Unbalanced Implementation Frames
 Positive Negative
 Operations ^vv/vv^^ /vvvvvvvv^
 '///' Balanced |x^| Unbalanced
 Note: Balanced frames (often held by Users) represent cognitions that include information from all
 four quadrants. Unbalanced frames (often held by Implementers) represent cognitions that only include
 information from the Positive/Description quadrant. Surprises during implementation are more likely
 for users provided with Unbalanced implementation frames.
 users listed comments from each of
 the four quadrants described
 above: (1) Positive/Description -
 "The system lets you concentrate
 on one problem at a time," (2) Neg-
 ative/Description - "Some people
 are intimidated in a computer fa-
 cility," (3) Positive/Operation -
 "You should practice using all the
 keys," and (4) Negative/Opera-
 tion - "Do not read other people's
 comments before writing your
 own." The distribution of this in-
 formation was significantly less bi-
 ased than was the information the
 implementers said they would pro-
 vide to new users.
 Again, implementers* greater ex-
 posure to and experience with the
 new technology no doubt has low-
 ered the salience of operational
 concerns; for an expert user, those
 things are well learned and as-
 sumed. Thus, implementers prob-
 ably underestimate the complexity
 or difficulty that prospective users
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 perceive when they are first intro-
 duced to a new technology. In such
 situations, novice users will have a
 strong need to reduce uncertainty
 (Lester, 1986) and gain control
 (Falcione and Wilson, 1988).
 Of course, the quadrants in Fig-
 ure 3 hold different levels of im-
 portance in implementation. In
 particular, without Positive De-
 scriptions (e.g., descriptions of the
 benefits of adopting the new tech-
 nology), prospective users are un-
 likely to get very interested in the
 new technology. This suggests that
 implementers have an advocacy
 role, a responsibility to sell the
 technology to prospective users. It
 also emphasizes the critical role
 that implementers play as the start-
 ing point for users' interpretations
 of their initial experiences with the
 technology.
 The "paradox of value" is that im-
 plementers present users an unreal-
 istically positive and insufficiently
 practical view of a new technology
 (represented in Figure 3 as the Un-
 balanced/I mplemen ter frame). As a
 consequence, users' first experiences
 with a new technology will be frus-
 trating. Although users may discover
 some positive surprises (benefits of
 the technology that they were not
 aware of), for the most part users
 will encounter "negative surprises "
 (Louis, 1980). These negative sur-
 prises will be of two different sorts.
 First, users will encounter negatives
 of the technology - things the tech-
 nology cannot do that users ex-
 pected it could. Second, users will
 encounter operational difficulties -
 users will be unable to make the
 technology work correctly because
 implementers did not provide
 enough practical information to in-
 sure operational success. Users' ini-
 tial experiences with the technology
will be negative, and their attitudes
toward and subsequent use of the
 new technology will suffer accord-
 ingly.
 The paradox here is that imple-
 menters face a dilemma. If imple-
 menters present a balanced view of
 the technology (a balanced view of
 the technology's positives and neg-
 atives), they are abdicating their ad-
 vocacy role and risk losing initial
 user interest. If implementers pres-
 ent an advocacy view of the tech-
 nology (a view biased toward
 positive descriptions), they risk los-
 ing long-term user interest via neg-
 ative surprises encountered during
 initial experiences with the tech-
 nology. Significantly, this dilemma
 may be a false one because of a
 second paradox in new technology
 implementation: the paradox of ex-
 perience.
 PARADOX 2:
 The Paradox of Experience
 A central issue in the cognitively
 elaborated model shown in Figure
 2 is the timing of user experience
 with the new technology. In fact,
 the "paradox of value" rests on two
 subtle but critical assumptions: (1)
 that negative surprises are costly,
 and (2) that negative surprises have
 no benefits. Both of these assump-
 tions are premised on a traditional
 model of implementation in which
 implementers present a new tech-
 nology to users during unfreezing,
 and then users first use the new
 technology during movement. But
 is this traditional model a necessary
 pr mise?
 In his classic article on the "tech-
 nology of foolishness," March
 JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. V Number 4 Winter 1993
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 (1971) suggests that there is value
 when organizations institutionalize
 a way for members to challenge the
 organization's operational rules
 and cultural assumptions - to be
 "foolish." The organizational value
 of foolishness, of course, is that an
 individual's challenges force the or-
 ganization to evaluate the wisdom
 of its rules and assumptions. If an
 organization's assumptions and
 rules are never challenged, they
 may become obsolete and dysfunc-
 tional without anyone knowing it.
 Foolishness allows an organization
 to validate or modify its rules and
 assumptions, to evolve and thereby
 to remain viable. Of course, an or-
 ganization can learn and adapt
 from foolishness only if foolishness
 can be accomplished at low cost.
 Costly foolishness may be no better
 for the organization than costly ad-
 herence to outdated or dysfunc-
 tional rules and assumptions.
 The analog to March's foolish-
 ness in new technology implemen-
 tation is the opportunity for users
 to test and modify their social con-
 structions of a new technology. If
 implementers have led users to
 construct unrealistic and impracti-
 cal preliminary understandings of
 a new technology, as shown in Fig-
 ure 2, experiences with the new
 technology will provide opportu-
 nities to test and modify those un-
 derstandings. There remains,
 however, the caution offered by
 March that the foolishness must
 not itself prove more costly than
 holding an incorrect construction.
 While cost in March's technology of
 foolishness is cost to the organiza-
 tion, in new technology implemen-
 tation the cost is also personal cost
 to the user.
 Initial experience with a tech-
 ology can be roughly divided into
 two ypes, Free Training and On-
 the-Job Performance. Free Train-
 ing refers to time taken to learn the
 technology before users must ac-
 tually use the technology for re-
 quired work. Training with the
 particular technology at the ven-
 dor's site, practice in a classroom
 setting, and free time at work are
 all examples of Free Training. The
 "free" in Free Training refers to
 the cost of mistakes. During train-
 ing, the cost of making mistakes is
 relatively free. (For an in-depth dis-
 cussion of manufacturing technol-
 ogy training and practices, see
 Goodman and Miller, 1990.) In
 contrast, On-the-Job Performance
 is initial experience while the user
 is doing required work. While users
 provided Free Training would be
 expected to continue to learn while
 on the job, the distinction here is
 a critical one: Free Training does
 not require that users perform re-
 quired work while initially experi-
 encing the technology; On-the-Job
 Performance does. The importance
 of this distinction arises from the
 cost and/or tension incurred by the
 users when their expectations and
 understandings do not match the
 organizational reality of using the
 technology. Negative surprises will
 be high cost if encountered when
 they are reflected on the job in the
 user's performance. Negative sur-
 prises will be low cost for users if
 they take place before work is re-
 quired or evaluated. These costs
 would be expected to affect one of
 the central goals of implementa-
 tion - users' attitudes toward using
 the technology.
 March's point is that negative
 surprises provide important learn-
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 ing opportunities, but learning op-
 portunities that must be managed.
 Managing a learning opportunity
 means no cost to the user for being
 wrong or making mistakes - that
 learning is not punished, as long as
 the efforts are made in good faith.
 In many traditional change efforts,
 the first real opportunity for users
 to experiment with the new tech-
 nology occurs when it "counts,"
 when mistakes are costly to both
 the individual and the organiza-
 tion. Free Training suggests a cost-
 less opportunity for users to
 encounter negative surprises, when
 these negatives might not be ex-
 pected to have such a deleterious
 effect on user attitudes.
 This raises the second assump-
 tion made in the "paradox of
 value" - that surprises have no ben-
 efits for users. As noted before,
 one of the primary goals of new
 technology implementation is to in-
 still in users appropriate attitudes
 toward the technology. An impor-
 tant component of appropriate at-
 titudes toward a new technology is
 the belief that there is more to
 learn; that there remain, for in-
 stance, creative new uses for the
 new technology or even better ways
 for it to accomplish its intended
 purposes. Louis (1980) has noted
 that people typically test and mod-
 ify their understandings using a
 confirmation process. This means
 that users* constructed understand-
 ings will tell them how to interpret
 their experiences with a new tech-
 nology, and that users will modify
 their constructions only if experi-
 ences invalidate the expectations.
 The confirmation strategy is im-
 portant because it suggests that
 users will be motivated to search
 for additional information during
 experience with a new technology
 only if he frame they are provided
 during implementation leads them
 to discover th  they are missing
 information. A  a result, if imple-
 menters present balanced views of
 a new technology, there is some
 danger that us rs will confirm what
 they have been told and conclude
 that they understand the technol-
 og . An unbalanced (positively bi-
 ased) presentation by implementers,
 on he other hand, inevitably will
 lead users to encounter surprises
 during implementation. Thus, users
 will gain a healthy desire to learn
 more, to explore more, as long as
 encountering the suprises is not
 costly! This healthy skepticism about
 the new technology should contrib-
 ute to the feedback-and-redesign
 processes necessary for implemen-
 tation success (Goodman and Grif-
 fith, 1991), as well as greater
 knowledge of the system. Technol-
 ogies typically fit organizational and
 user needs in some ways while need-
 ing adjustment in others (Leonard-
 Barton, 1988). When users have a
 healthy skepticism about new tech-
 nology, they will anticipate these is-
 sues. The result is that users are
 given the opportunity to take re-
 sponsibility for their own learning
 (e.g., Bowen, 1980), learning by ex-
 perience rather than by being told.
 This should encourage more com-
 mitment (e.g., Salancik, 1977) and
 more favorable attitudes toward the
 technology.
 The paradox of experience is
 that a little failure is good, maybe
 necessary, to successful implemen-
 tation, and that disconfirmation is
 useful as long as it is not costly to
 users. When combined with the
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 paradox of value, the paradox of
 experience suggests the implemen-
 tation outcomes shown in Figure 4.
 If users are provided (by imple-
 menters) Balanced (Realistic)
 frames and are then give Free
 Training time, confirmation should
 lead users to believe that there is
 little more to learn about the tech-
 nology. As long as the accuracy of
 their frame holds, these users will
 have been given a costless oppor-
 tunity to test their expectations
 against reality. As their expecta-
 tions are not challenged or discon-
 firmed (since they started with a
 realistic frame), they should verify
 their understanding (construction)
 of the technology and not be mo-
 tivated to investigate the technolog-
 ical system further. This prediction
 is based on the susceptibility of in-
 dividual decision makers to satisf-
 icing (March and Simon, 1958) and
 confirmation biases (Klay an and
 Ha, 1987). Users in this situation
 should be relatively pleased with
 the technology. They will have en-
 countered no negative surprises
 and their performance should be
 satisfactory, up to the level that
 they understand the technological
 system. But these users will not
 continue to explore and adapt the
 technology.
 The above argument also largely
 holds for users who are provided
 Balanced (Realistic) frames during
 implementation but are required to
 first experience the technology
 during On-the-Job Performance.
 Even though mistakes are likely to
 be costly, users are not likely to be
 surprised because they have a bal-
 anced (though perhaps shallow)
 understanding of the technology.
 Figure 4
 Critical Outcomes of Four Possible Implementation Techniques
 Balanced Frame Unbalanced Frame
 (Realistic/User) (Unrealistic/Implementer)
 High Knowledge
 Free Training Low Perceived Need to Learn High Perceived Need to Learn
 High Performance
 On-the-Job Performance Low Perceived Need to Learn Dissatisfaction
 Note: These are the critical outcomes expected given the implementation technique described by
 the specific quadrant
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 Users in this quadrant are also
 likely to test the technology, find it
 to be as they expect, and thus sus-
 pend their tests (Klayman and Ha,
 1987). Therefore, these users are
 also expected (relative to other
 quadrants in Figure 4) to not be-
 lieve that there is much else to
 learn or that there are more ad-
 aptations to make. As in the pre-
 vious quadrant, these users should
 be satisfied and able to perform
 their basic tasks - but, again, are
 not inquisitive.
 The Balanced implementation
 frame scenarios engender satisfac-
 tory but not completely successful
 implementation. These implemen-
 tation techniques may result in im-
 plementation that is only successful
 in the short term, a form of im-
 plementation failure (Goodman
 and Griffith, 1991; Leonard-Bar-
 ton, 1988). More specifically, the
 users are able to perform the tasks
 that the implementers have specif-
 ically prepared them for; however,
 balanced implementation frames
 do not instill in users the need for
 further discovery, and user knowl-
 edge of the system (and its further
 adaptation and redesign) is likely to
 stagnate. The users may have the
 highest satisfaction, since there are
 no negative surprises in their initial
 use. A discrepancy model of satis-
 faction where satisfaction is mod-
 eled by the discrepancy between
 what is desired and the actual state
 (e.g., Locke, 1969; Katzell, 1964)
 would certainly not predict dissat-
 isfaction.
 Users who are provided Unbal-
 anced frames during implementa-
 tion are more likely to have volatile
 implementations. Users with Un-
 balanced frames are destined to be
 surprised since technologies and
 organizations are complex. Users
 are missing information from three
 of the four quadrants if they de-
 velop unbalanced frames. Given
 that the bias of their frames is to-
 ward Positive Description, chal-
 lenges to their frames (surprises)
 are also likely to be negative. The
 effect of these negative surprises is
 the basis for the predictions in the
 last two quadrants.
 For users with positively Unbal-
 anced frames, who receive their ex-
 perience with the technology only
 during On-the-Job Performance,
 negative surprises may be very
 costly. The scenario might be as
 follows: users have tasks to per-
 form; the implementers build up
 the technology's capabilities in
 terms of being able to complete the
 task; but, because the users only
 have been given a "sales-pitch" in-
 troduction, they may not be actu-
 ally able to do the task. There also
 may be some negative aspects of
 using this technology to perform
 this task. Consider electronic meet-
 ing support systems - such systems
 may provide benefits of documen-
 tation and anonymity, but users
 should be aware of the possible
 costs of losing the emphasis of ver-
 bal exchanges. Finally, it may be
 that there are certain things the
 users should not do in using the
 technology. An example of this in
 a computer setting might be, "Do
 not turn off the computer without
 first saving your work." To do so
 and inadvertently destroy the work
 would certainly provide a very neg-
 ative surprise on most computer
 systems.
 If the users are required and re-
 sponsible for completing a task
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 (i.e., real, evaluated on-the-job per-
 formance), any of the above sce-
 narios would be likely to invoke
 disastrous results and subsequently,
 negative attitudes towards the tech-
 nology. Initial contacts with a new
 technology are significant sociali-
 zation experiences. The results of
 costly surprises for users (e.g., lost
 work, incomplete tasks, or simply
 frustration) during the initial ex-
 periences with the technology may
 be difficult to overcome.
 What if these negative surprises
 were encountered during Free
 Training? The previously men-
 tioned discrepancy models of sat-
 isfaction (Locke, 1969; Katzell,
 1964) would still emphasize the dif-
 ference between the desired and
 actual level of performance, yet the
 importance would be much lower.
 The impact of negative surprises
 will be less if encountered during
 Free Training than if encountered
 during On-the-Job Performance
 because the cost of mistakes (to
 users) is less during Free Training.
 The purpose of Free Training is to
 give the users costless opportunities
 to experience the differences be-
 tween their social construction of
 the technology and reality. Free
 Training provides the opportunity
 to correct users' understandings be-
 fore they have to use the technol-
 ogy for actual work, before those
 negative surprises might enter into
 their individual performance re-
 cords.
 The predicted results are positive
 with Unbalanced/Free Training im-
 plementation. Knowledge should
 be higher because the users dis-
 cover the Negative Description and
 Operational information for them-
 selves. Because this learning takes
 place without the pressures of On-
 the-Job Performance, attitud s
 should not be negative because mis-
 takes are less costly. P rformance
 when working with the technology
 is finally required s ould be high,
 given the greater understanding of
 the tec nology from prior experi-
 mentation. Be ides these users hav-
 ing less risk, they have had more
 time to practice before beginning
 the task. Users provided with Free
 Training and an Unbalanced frame
 should understand that there is al-
 ways more to learn. Certainly there
 was more for users to learn in the
 beginning and both Klayman and
 Has (1987) and Louis' (1980 and
 1989) work lead us to predict that
 challenges to users' beliefs will pro-
 vide the impetus for users to con-
 tinue to look for new ways of
 understanding the technology.
 Beyond Paradox In New
 Technology Implementation
 The model presented here has
 elaborated the role of cognitions -
 specifically user and implementer
 frames - in new technology imple-
 mentation. The model reveals two
 paradoxes: the paradox of value
 and the paradox of experience.
 The paradox of value occurs when
 the divergence between user
 frames (the balanced information
 that users need) and implementer
 frames (the unbalanced informa-
 tion that implementers provide)
 creates negative surprises for users
 when they experience a new tech-
 nology. The paradox of experience
 is that these negative surprises
 need not be costly and may be key
 components of successful imple-
 mentation.
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 The distinction between balanced
 and unbalanced implementer frames
 is not equivalent to surprises and no
 surprises for prospective users. Even
 balanced implementer presentations
 are likely to produce some user sur-
 prises. Implementers cannot avoid
 users being surprised. Implementers
 cannot transmit everything because
 the opportunity to transmit infor-
 mation during unfreezing is limited.
 Additionally, implementers may not
 fully understand the setting and/or
 context themselves. So, for imple-
 menters, the question is not whether
 there are going to be surprises (there
 are), but how those surprises are go-
 ing to be managed. Managing im-
 plementation surprises such that
 they are costless is critical to height-
 ening the status of those surprises as
 learning opportunities.
 The frame-based model of im-
 plementation offered in this paper
 stresses the critical role of user ex-
 periences with the unfreezing stage
 of implementation (when users are
 being introduced to a new tech-
 nology). There is an interesting
 parallel here to the emphasis of or-
 ganizational development ap-
 proaches to change (e.g., Huse and
 Cummings, 1985). Organizational
 development emphasizes the im-
 portance of doing diagnosis and
 adoption with an eye to unfreezing,
 usually by involving prospective
 users in adoption decision making.
 This frame-based model of imple-
 mentation emphasizes managing
 unfreezing with an eye to move-
 ment, by providing user experience
 with the technology while mistakes
 are still relatively costless.
 The conflict between expecta-
 tions and reality inherent in imple-
 mentation provides the energy and
 framework for continuous im-
 provement of the organizational
 and technological system (if this en-
 ergy is not dampened by the per-
 sonal necessity of simply getting the
 work done). The organizational ne-
 cessity of continuous adaptation
 parallels the ideas of continuous
 improvement from Total Quality
 Management (TQM). By drawing
 from the more generally under-
 stood ideas of TQM, technology
 implementation may be able to
 build on some existing social con-
 structions. The social construction
 of continuous improvement is pos-
 sibly understood by the general
 management population through
 the extensive marketing given
 TQM and the Malcolm Baldrige
 quality award.
 Continuous mutual adaptation
 between new technology and the
 organizational setting is a key proc-
 ess in managing for successful im-
 plementation (Leonard-Barton,
 1988). However, managers must
 accept and prepare for the neces-
 sary changes through budgeting,
 design and user/feedback groups,
 free training time, etc. Tyre and
 Orlikowski (in press) provide data
 which suggest that current organ-
 izational mechanisms provide lim-
 ited opportunities for adaptation
 after implementation. Thus, the in-
 terrelated processes of redesign
 and implementation suggested
 here first require innovation in the
 implementation process itself. The
 idea is to become better at being
 more flexible and learning to learn.
 This article focused on cogni-
 tions of the implementers and
 users which may promote adapta-
 tion and deeper understanding of
 new technologies. The key propo-
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 sition is that the pitfall of unbal-
 anced implementation frames and
 the paradoxes of value and expe-
 rience may be turned into promises
 of successful implementation. Man-
 agers must prepare and accept the
 costs of the users learning to be-
 come experts:
 Tell me, and I forget
 Show me, and I remember
 Involve me, and I understand
 (Chinese proverb)
 Managers wanting to apply this
 philosophy to their new technology
 implementations need only to chal-
 lenge their users with the technol-
 ogy. First, the technology itself
 must be designed with adaptation
 in mind - the technology must be
 flexible so that users can develop it
 as their understanding of it and the
 context develops. This creates the
 reality that there will always be
 more to learn and, over time, will
 enhance the value of the technol-
 ogy n a general rganizational
 sense. Next, users ust be pro-
 vided with problems that challenge
 them to push the technology and
 their understanding of it. ost im-
 portantly, users must be allowed
 the time to address these challenges
 without the burden of required
 work or the onus of performance
 appraisal. Finally, managers need
 to acknowledge that users will need
 time later on, after they have be-
 come comfortable with the tech-
 nology, to readdress the learning
 process. Users will need the op-
 portunity to find more difficult
 problems and the chance to solve
 these costlessly as well. Using this
 implementation technique should
 increase users' knowledge of, pos-
 itive attitudes toward, and quality
 use of the technology. These out-
 comes benefit the organization as
 well as its members.
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